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The Kyoto Protocol’s approach of assigning emission targets, or “caps,” promises certainty that it 
cannot deliver, because it exacerbates problems with international cooperation and commitment. 
Global carbon pricing addresses these problems and, with less risk and more reward, can generate and 
sustain stronger policies. 
This paper proposes a system, “flexible global carbon pricing,” designed to replace the Kyoto 
Protocol. It provides backward-compatibility with the Kyoto Protocol by allowing un-modified cap 
and trade as one form of national carbon pricing. Instead of many national “caps,” the proposal sets a 
global target price for carbon and specifies a pair of incentives.  
A Pricing Incentive rewards nations that set their carbon price higher than the global target and 
penalizes nations that underachieve. These rewards and penalties sum to zero by design. The strength 
of the Pricing Incentive is adjusted automatically so that the global average carbon price converges to 
the global target price. 
A Clean Development Incentive (CDI), free from the gaming problems that plague the U.N.’s 
Clean Development Mechanism, encourages full participation by low-emission countries. An ex-
ample, based on a $20 price target, causes transfers from the United States of only seven cents per 
capita per day. Nevertheless, India’s CDI receipts cover its compliance costs. The example shows that 
low costs can be guaranteed. 
Keywords 
Kyoto protocol ; cap and trade ; flexible global carbon pricing ; international cooperation  
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Preface 
This paper presents a carbon-pricing alternative to the Kyoto Protocol’s cap-and-trade approach. To 
motivate such a proposal, I point out several advantages of global carbon pricing over the Kyoto 
approach, but these are not intended to be a rigorous comparison of the two systems. The purpose of 
this paper is to present an alternative system in enough detail that comparisons can be discussed 
concretely, and to explain the motivations behind various design features and how the features work. 
Since technical criticisms of cap and trade can easily be misinterpreted as assigning blame, I would 
like to point out two significant benefits of having 39 nations adopt emission caps under the Kyoto 
Protocol. First, this has shown that even with most of the world free-riding, and under a mechanism 
that provides little incentive for cooperation, many nations are willing to make significant sacrifices 
for the public good. Second, this has established a carbon price of roughly $30 per ton as a non-trivial 
starting benchmark. In short, those who accepted caps under the Protocol have put us far ahead of 
where we would have been under the alternative scenario of no policy. 
The source of the current troubles is not those who have adopted caps or implemented cap and 
trade. Instead, the trouble was caused by the displacement of the carbon-tax paradigm by the cap-and-
trade paradigm at the Kyoto conference. The driving force behind the idea of caps was the faulty 
analogy, originating in the United States, between coal-fired power plants and nations, and between 
the Kyoto conference and the U.S. government. This proved to be an exceptionally poor guide to the 
attitudes of developing countries and to the limited ability of the Kyoto conference to enforce its 
program. Unfortunately, that analogy remains dominant in the United States, which has only just now 
recognized that China is serious in its rejection of a meaningful cap. 
It is also important to recognize that the developing countries are not to blame for the failure of 
Kyoto’s national capping approach. Such caps would necessarily cap the developing countries at per-
capita levels far below the U.S. level of emissions in spite of the fact that they have contributed little 
to the problem of climate change. Also, caps are dangerous for a country like China. For example, its 
emissions grew 27% between 1990 and 2000. What if it had committed in 2000 to cap itself in 2010 at 
27 percent above its 2000 level—a seemingly modest goal? It would have found itself, by current 
predictions, having to reduce its emissions in ten years by 40 percent relative to business as usual. This 
would have been exceptionally costly and exceedingly unfair.  
1. Introduction
∗ 
The Kyoto Protocol has been troubled from the start. Eleven years after its adoption, with the 
Copenhagen renegotiation conference fast approaching, no clear remedies have been found for the 
problems caused by the Protocol’s emission targets, or “caps.” These problems include outright 
rejection by most countries, a Russian cap so loose it could only increase total emissions, and failures 
to comply with accepted caps. Moreover, the developing countries, which have rejected caps for 15 
years, continue to reject them, and even the United States now admits that China will not accept a cap. 
The failure of the Protocol to cap half of all emissions—and by far the faster-growing half—leaves 
only one small hope for the Kyoto approach. The carbon credits issued under the Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism could be used to pay developing countries to control their emissions. Such 
an inverted market design, which pays emitters for not doing harm instead of for supplying goods, is 
prone to corruption (see Appendix A.1). Also it is inefficient because U.N. approval cannot reach 
                                                      
∗  The author would like to thank Jurgen Weiss, Marcelo Saguan, Douglas Hale, and especially Daniel Kirshner for helpful 
comments and suggestions. An almost identical proposal is explained in a more elementary fashion in Part 4 of 
Carbonomics: How to Fix the Climate and Charge It to OPEC, by Steven Stoft, Diamond Press, 2008. Steven Stoft 
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moderate-to-small-scale efforts. Clearly the developed countries are not about to finance such an in 
appropriate and expensive method of reining in the larger part of the world’s emissions. The Kyoto 
approach has reached a dead end, and a new approach is necessary. 
A number of leading U.S. economists have believed this for some time; see Richard N. Cooper 
(2008, 2007, 2000, 1998), N. Gregory Mankiw (2008), William D. Nordhaus (2008, 2007a, 2005), and 
Joseph E. Stiglitz (2007). James E. Hansen (2009), the climate scientist most respected by 
environmentalists, shares this view. Under the circumstances, it seems prudent to explore the 
alternative approach suggested by these and other experts.  
The alternative approach calls for a global target price for carbon emissions, or preferably a target 
price for greenhouse gases. This single target price would replace all national caps and would apply as 
well to nations currently without caps. Such an approach aims at achieving international cooperation, 
unlike the carbon-cap approach, which seeks instead to gain certainty of emissions. But aiming for 
certainty is no guarantee of achieving it. Industrialized (OECD) countries will increase emissions more 
than 20 percent by 2012, the end of the Kyoto commitment period, rather than reduce emissions by 5 
percent, the goal set in 1997. During that same period, the rate of world emissions will increase by 50 
percent. 
The real-world uncertainty of caps contrasts starkly with their theoretical certainty. The explanation 
is that the attempt to lock in quantities with a cap undermines perceived fairness, financial 
predictability, and enforceability—all qualities needed for effective cooperation and commitment.
1 
Moreover, caps reproduce the exact externality problem they are intended to solve. They do this by 
requiring encouraging every nation to negotiate for a higher cap and against the common interest of 
climate stability. But requiring nations to agree on a single carbon price target, applicable to all, comes 
close to internalizing the climate externality. Appendix A.1 explains this point and other uncertainties 
caused by caps. 
Flexible Global Carbon Pricing 
Global carbon pricing has been proposed many times. Nordhaus (2008) makes an exceptionally good 
case for what he calls a system of “internationally harmonized carbon taxes,” but he provides few 
details. Cooper (2008), who proposes to “levy a common charge on all emissions of greenhouse gases, 
worldwide,” provides considerably more detail and makes an equally strong case for global carbon 
pricing in general and his approach in particular. 
Flexible global carbon pricing, presented here, is a third variant of global carbon pricing. Cooper 
takes a step toward flexibility by stating that his common charge can coexist with cap and trade, 
provided limits are placed on the variability of permit prices. But he does not provide for the 
compliance flexibility now offered by international permit trading, which allows nations to miss their 
target and instead pay other nations for help with compliance. Flexible carbon pricing accommodates 
such an option. It also provides national discretion in targeting different fuels just as the Protocol’s 
national emission targets provide. 
Preview 
Flexible global carbon pricing comprises: a definition of national carbon price, the Pricing Incentive, 
its adjustment rule, and a Clean Development Incentive. Both incentives require transfers of funds, or 
perhaps of clean-technology shopping credits. These will flow from some nations to others through a 
central agency. The transfer payment rules guarantee that both incentives will pay for themselves. 
                                                      
1  China, India and Brazil have expressed their perception of unfairness for the last 15 years. The volatility of permit prices 
under a cap is well known. Canada provides a prime example of the difficulty of enforcing caps. Flexible Global Carbon Pricing 
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Those wishing to see a simple mathematical summary of the basic design should look ahead to Table 
2. 
•  The definition of the national carbon price 
To be backward-compatible, carbon pricing must accommodate existing cap-and-trade policies. As 
will be explained, carbon revenues can be associated with permit retirements under a cap. 
Revenues from caps and taxes are then used to define a national carbon price. 
•  The Pricing Incentive 
Nations are not required to set their national carbon price equal to the target. Instead the Pricing 
Incentive, based on national carbon revenues, rewards nations for collecting extra carbon revenue 
and penalizes them for under-collecting. 
•  The Pricing Incentive adjustment rule 
A reward/penalty percentage  , for over- and under-collections, is increased annually until the 
global average carbon price equals the global target price. 
•  The Clean Development Incentive (CDI) 
The CDI encourages low-emission nations to participate fully. It also helps pay their compliance 
costs, and it encourages all nations to achieve additional emission reductions through non-price 
policies such as efficiency standards. 
Carbon Prices under Emission Targets and under a Target Price 
Using a carbon price instead of a cap raises a concern over effectiveness for who favor caps. One 
simple reminder may allay some fears. A carbon tax of $X per ton should be somewhat more effective 
than a carbon cap with an average permit price of $X per ton. This is because the volatility of the 
permit price makes investing more risky. This risk increases the cost of investing, which causes delays 
and also increases the option value of waiting to invest. And, of course, it must be remembered that 
the cap itself has no direct effect on business decisions—only the price of carbon permits matters. 
From the start of the European Emissions Trading scheme on April 22, 2005 until April 27, 2009, 
permit prices were 2.9 times more volatile than the U.S. stock market during that same period.
2 Of 
course a carbon tax can be changed by law, and this creates some risk, but this is mirrored by an 
equivalent risk of the cap, or one of its safety valves, being changed. So there is no reason to think a 
tax suffers from greater regulatory risk. 
Hence, in order for emission targets to be more effective than a price target, the emission targets 
will need to generate a higher average carbon price. This could happen if nations vote to lock in 
emissions targets that produce higher prices than they expect and then comply with those targets. 
While such a miscalculation seems possible, it seems at least as possible that the unpredictable nature 
of prices under a cap will cause nations to adopt weak caps to avoid unpleasant surprises. 
One advantage of a pricing target is that it is not locked in, as the Kyoto targets have been for 15 
years. Since the evidence for climate change is expected to become more dramatic over time, the 
acceptable cost of carbon policy should be expected to increase over time. As this happens, a price 
target can easily be increased.  
In any case, the price target will be decided politically, based on perceived risks—both climatic and 
financial. Although the quantity-based approach presumes only science will influence the target 
quantity, both approaches will face the same political tradeoffs. Because a price-based approach 
minimizes risks and perceived unfairness, and, as will be discussed, maximizes national benefits and 
flexibility, the balance of risks may well be struck at a higher carbon price under global pricing. 
                                                      
2  Monthly changes in ETS futures with a settlement date of December 2012 were compared with the S&P 500. Steven Stoft 
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The Four Challenges of a Pricing Design 
The design of flexible global carbon pricing addresses four major challenges. 
1.  Flexibility: Avoid disrupting existing cap-and-trade systems and allow maximum workable 
flexibility, guided by incentives, in setting national carbon prices. 
2.  Enforcement: Guarantee that the global carbon-price target is achieved on average. 
3.  Clean Development: Encourage full participation by developing countries. 
4.  Non-price policies: Encourage non-price policies to reduce emissions. 
The first challenge is self-explanatory. The second, enforcement, has not been met by the Kyoto 
Protocol so it remains essential. The third challenge, clean development, is identified by Nordhaus 
(2008, p. 150.), who suggests that “poor countries might receive transfers to encourage early and 
complete participation.” 
The fourth challenge is addressed well by a system of caps, but not at all by simply setting a 
uniform international price for carbon. Under a cap, energy research and fuel-efficiency standards help 
to meet a cap. But since these do not tax carbon, they do nothing to help a country comply with a 
carbon-pricing requirement. 
The next four sections present the basic design of this proposal and address the four challenges. 
Appendix A.2 through A.5 addresses more subtle questions in each of these four design areas. 
Appendix B presents a more complete design. 
2. Flexibility and the Definition of “National Carbon Price” 
Accommodation of the European Union’s cap and trade system is crucial to the success of any 
international climate agreement. To accomplish this within a price-based system, define a single 
national price,  , as total national carbon revenue divided by total carbon emissions,  .  
  National carbon-price definition:      (1) 
The next step is to associate a revenue stream with carbon permits.
3 Carbon permits must be retired 
periodically to cover emissions. For example, if retirement happens annually, define annual carbon 
revenue as the number of permits retired times the average price of permits during the year.
4 This rule 
works whether permits are given out for free or auctioned. Revenues from carbon taxes can simply be 
added to the revenues associated with carbon permits. Revenues from carbon subsidies must be 
subtracted. (Because of this, even a carbon price target of zero would have a significant effect if it 
caused the elimination of fossil-fuel subsidies.)  
While cap and trade prices are unpredictable, the enforcement mechanism described in the next 
section allows for any magnitude of deviation from the global target price. There are rewards and 
penalties for price deviations, but they should nearly cancel out if permit prices are right on average. 
Appendix A.2 explains how international offsets could be accommodated. 
The flexibility resulting from the total-revenue approach to defining price means a country could 
tax, for example, only oil or only coal. A carbon tax focused only on oil is of particular concern. 
However, the Clean Development Incentive (CDI) will be seen to reward any reduction in emissions, 
                                                      
3  Cap and trade is just a carbon tax set by the permit market. Free permits just give those who receive them a right to some 
of the tax revenue. Equation (1) is a way of measuring this tax revenue. 
4  For the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme the price could be the daily average over the emissions year of the price of the 
ECX EUA Futures contract that settles at the end of the emissions year. Flexible Global Carbon Pricing 
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which will encourage a higher carbon price for coal. This and other factors discussed in Appendix A.2 
make a serious distortion of carbon prices unlikely. If necessary, the design could easily be adjusted to 
require some level of emphasis on coal. Flexibility in pricing will encourage participation and the 
acceptance of a higher target carbon price. 
One concern with flexible pricing will need to be addressed from the start: carbon pricing for 
energy-intensive exports, such as aluminum. Kyoto’s caps allow a similar flexibility in carbon pricing, 
so this concern must be addressed in any case. Energy-intensive exports will need closer international 
alignment than other sectors, but such details are not discussed in this study. 
3. Enforcement: The Pricing Incentive and Adjustment Rule 
Global carbon pricing sets a single target price of carbon for the world. A nation can be sure of 
achieving the target simply by taxing all emissions at the target price. Similarly, a nation can meet a 
quantity target by capping all emissions. However, as with caps, a more complex policy can introduce 
some uncertainty as to what emissions level or carbon price will be achieved. Also, under either 
system, a country can deliberately miss its target. Under the Protocol, a nation can purchase 
international offsets or allowance from other countries to compensate for underachievement. 
As with the Kyoto Protocol, individual nations should be allowed to underachieve the global 
pricing target. Under flexible global carbon pricing, an underachieving nation can make a payment to 
a fund supervised, for example, by the U.N. This fund is used only to pay other countries for 
overachieving their target price. 
In effect, this creates a market in which underachieving nations pay other nations to overachieve. 
On the surface, however, this mechanism functions simply as a monetary incentive that penalizes 
nations with low carbon prices and rewards those with high carbon prices. But, just as with caps, a 
nation could underachieve and then refuse to pay, so the payment requirement must be backed by 
something stronger. As Stiglitz (2007) and Cooper (2008) argue, the World Trade Organization has 
established a precedent for using trade penalties to enforce environmental concerns. This topic is 
discussed further in Appendix A.3. The present section discusses how the Pricing Incentive is used to 
induce nations to set their carbon prices so that the average global price of carbon  , will closely 
track the global target price,  . 
The Pricing Incentive 
Because nations vary in size, the Pricing Incentive must be proportional to national carbon price,  , 
scaled by the nation’s level of total emissions,  . The result,   is carbon revenue. The incentive 
payment is proportional to the amount by which a nation’s carbon revenue exceeds its target revenue, 
. It will prove convenient to express incentive payments on a per-capita basis, so we convert 
total emissions,  , to emissions per capita,  , by dividing by population. The Pricing Incentive is 
then expressed as follows: 
  Pricing Incentive payment per capita:    (2) 
The incentive strength,  , might be, for example, 10 percent. 
With   = $20/ton and   = 5 tons per capita, if a country increases its carbon price,  , from $18 
to $21/ton, its incentive payment,  , will rise from 10%·($18−$20)·5, or −$1.00, to +$0.50 for a gain 
of $1.50 per person per year.
5 Thus equation (2) provides an incentive for nations at every price level 
                                                      
5  The cases in which all nations, or none, set   are handled by the revenue-neutral version of this incentive in 
Appendix C. In the case without penalties, no rewards are needed, since all nations are over-achieving. Steven Stoft 
6 
to raise their price. The equation uses annual values, and, as explained in Appendix A.3, payments can 
be made promptly by using an estimate and true-up. 
The Pricing-Incentive Adjustment Rule 
The next question must be how to set  , which is used to control the global average price of carbon. 
The basic strategy is to raise   when the average global price,  , is below the target price,  , and to 
lower   when   is greater than  . Increasing   increases the incentive of every country to set a 
higher price whether it is under- or over-achieving. A simple rule would be to increase   in 
proportion to how far   is below  . Algebraically, this would mean: 
  Pricing-Incentive adjustment rule:    (3) 
where   is   in the year following year  . 
Although the global average price will fluctuate, this rule prevents it from remaining either above 
or below  , so it will fluctuate around  . Generally this should keep the average price quite near the 
target. Since   determines penalties as well as rewards, without doubt, some penalized countries will 
complain that it is set too high. But, remember, any country can avoid the consequences of   simply 
by setting its national price to the global target price. 
Can the Pricing-Incentive-Rate   be Estimated?  
Even when a nation achieves the target price, and its Price-Incentive payment is zero, incentive 
strength,  , is still in control. Its value is the reason the nation did not choose a higher or lower 
carbon price and miss the target. Because nations always feel pressure from  , it will be best if   is 
small so that enforcement does not seem heavy-handed and does not involve large sums of money 
when nations deviate from the target price. But we cannot choose  , since it is determined 
automatically by equation (3) and by the way nations behave. But to check on whether the design is 
likely to function satisfactorily, we need to estimate  . 
Most countries would likely prefer to collect and keep $10 in carbon taxes rather than pay $1 to 
other countries. With a   of 10 percent, they must pay $1 out of every $10 not collected, or they must 
achieve the target price. This suggests that a   of 10 percent or less might be adequate. But what 
would a country do if it used cost-benefit analysis? That would mean trading off domestic abatement 
costs against international payments. Appendix A.3 (Result 1) shows that for such a countries   
would equal their price elasticity of demand for carbon emissions when   is set for compliance with 
the target price. 
As Appendix A.3 argues, this elasticity is less than the elasticity of fossil fuel with respect to its 
price. The appropriate time frame for measuring the elasticity is the political time horizon, and energy-
demand elasticities are quite low in the short run. Hence   is likely to have a low value whether 
determined by political psychology or cost-benefit analysis over a political time horizon. The CDI, 
which is discussed next provides a reason for   to be even lower. 
4. The Clean Development Incentive 
Developing countries have contributed little to the climate problem, but their help is needed to solve it. 
Low-emission countries have less to tax and a proportionally smaller tax burden. But full participation 
is still too much to ask of very-low-emission nations without some type of reciprocity transfers. These 
are provided by the Clean Development Incentive (CDI), which also serves to encourage full 
participation by low-emission countries. Flexible Global Carbon Pricing 
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The CDI relates to both a country’s income and its emissions. But for two reasons, emissions per 
capita should be used to calculate the CDI. First, the purchasing-power-parity problem makes 
international income comparisons difficult. Second, linking the incentive to emissions encourages 
emission reductions. In any case, emissions are well correlated with income. 
Besides emissions per capita, the CDI will involve a parameter,  , that determines the incentive’s 
strength. Although   must be negotiated, we will find an indicator that may serve as a starting point, 
or perhaps a focal point, for negotiations. The choice of   will be difficult, but not as difficult as the 
choices that must be made under the Kyoto Protocol. Under the Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), the tightness or looseness of each country’s emissions cap will determine its cost 
of, or income from, offsets. CDM offset payments serve the same functions as CDI payments but are 
made by the private sector under pressure from governments. The individual national caps used under 
CDM are like using different CDI parameters—different  s—for every country. 
The CDI design, together with  , determines transfer payments from high-emission countries to 
low-emission countries. The transfers could be monetary or could be, for example, shopping credits, 
good for agreed-upon clean-energy technologies. If the transfers are monetary, the use of the funds 
could be restricted in some way and overseen by an agreed-upon arbiter. All of these will be matters 
for negotiation, and are not discussed in this paper. 
Designing the CDI 
The design of the CDM focuses on transferring funds instead of on incentives. The result is 
problematic incentives, high expenses, and low emission reductions. The CDI design process focuses 
on incentives. Fortunately, three different approaches lead to a particularly simple formula for a CDI 
with good incentive properties. Two approaches suggest the same reasonable value for  .  
The first line of approach considers the classic solution to the problem of global warming when it is 
viewed as a “tragedy of the commons.” In this view the atmosphere is viewed as a global commons 
which is being over used by an excess of carbon emissions. The classic, market-based, solution to the 
problem of over-use is to issue equal atmospheric rights to each person and allow them to trade. Total 
rights are capped at the socially optimal level.  
Although this solution is completely impractical, its financial outcome is easily simulated at the 
national level. National transfers under equal rights are given by  , where   is the global 
average level of per-capita emissions, and   is the market price of rights. This is the CDI payment 
formula suggested by the first of our three approaches. 
Notice that an average-emissions country, one with  , will receive enough rights to cover its 
emissions. So it will neither buy nor sell rights, and the formula shows zero transfer payments. High-
emission countries must buy rights, and the formula assigns them a negative payment. Payments to 
low-emission countries help them cover their cost of compliance. Using this formula, CDI payments 
would also encourage countries to reduce emissions. So this “equal-rights CDI” has some good 
incentive properties, and we will soon add to it an incentive for compliance with the global target price 
of carbon. 
Unfortunately, as Appendix A.4 shows, the equal-rights CDI is too strong and too costly. In fact it 
is so strong that a sensible country would implement a national carbon price equal to   just to 
achieve a lower emissions rate and better CDI transfers. As Appendix A.4 explains, the equal-rights 
CDI could completely replace the Pricing Incentive except for the fact that its cost to high-emission 
countries would be politically unacceptable. We need a CDI that is similar but weaker. 
The second design approach is cost-based, and so requires a relevant cost to use as a basis its basis. 
Appendix A.4 shows that the cost   is an upper limit on the average, per-capita compliance Steven Stoft 
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cost experienced by low-emission countries when implementing flexible global carbon pricing. So this 
cost will be used as a benchmark for payments under a CDI. 
The next step is to decide which countries should receive transfers. The most natural dividing line 
would seem to be the average level of emissions per capita. This means that only those nations with 
 would receive CDI transfers, while those with   would pay. A country on the dividing 
line (with  ) should neither pay nor receive. And countries with emission-per-capita levels near 
 should pay and receive very little. Only the lowest-emission nations should receive a payment 
close in value to the full benchmark cost. 
This suggests that a country with   would receive  , while one with   would 
receive nothing, and those in between would receive a linearly interpolated value. This gives our 
second possible Clean-Development Incentive formula: 
  Possible Clean Development Incentive:    (4) 
Notice that this is the same formula as found with the equal-rights approach but multiplied by  . If 
 is set to  , the formula gives a payment of zero for  , as intended, and a payment of 
 when  , also as intended. The incentive-strength parameter,  , has been introduced 
because the selected cost is only a benchmark—a plausible value, but not one dictated by economic 
theory or by fully convincing design considerations. 
As argued above,   will likely be much less than one. Hence this formula determines payments 
that are smaller than the equal-rights payments, perhaps by a factor of ten. Nonetheless, very low-
emission countries will undoubtedly have compliance costs well below average cost of all low-
emission nations (well below   ), so the CDI will more than cover their costs. 










Low‐Emitter Nation  1 ton  $8  $9 
Average Country  5 tons ( )  $0  $0 
High‐Emitter Nation  20 tons  −$30  −$9 
Payments are per-person and annual. 
The basic CDI formula can better be understood with the help of the example shown in Table 1, which 
is roughly realistic. It assumes  , in equation (4), has a value of 10 percent, global average emissions 
is 5 tons per person per year, and   is $20/ton. The values in the third column ( ) are calculated 
from the values in column ( ) by using equation (4). Finding the total CDI transfers requires data on 
total emissions. Note that, as shown in Appendix A.4, and shown in the fourth column of Table 1, 
equation (4) is revenue neutral. 
We would probably not want to make CDI transfers to a country that did not implement carbon 
pricing at all (that is, a country that set   = 0). Otherwise the CDI would overwhelm the Pricing 
Incentive for low emission countries and they would be paid for doing nothing. It seems natural to 
scale back the transfers in proportion to any reduction in compliance with  . Flexible Global Carbon Pricing 
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So for countries receiving development payments we adjust  , the CDI payment from equation 
(4), as follows: 
  If   and  ,   multiply   by    (5) 
The result of applying equation (5) is shown in Figure 1. The graph assumes that   and 
applies to India which has an estimated emission rate of 1.1 tons/person in 2010, compared with a 
world average of 4.5 tons. Notice how the CDI transfer increases the incentive for India to achieve the 
target price,  , when  . This effect diminishes for countries as their emissions approach the 
average, but it encourages low-emission nations to set   near  . 
Equations (4) and (5) give the flexible-global-carbon-pricing recommendation for the Clean 
Development Incentive. But the value,  , should only be interpreted as a recommendation for a 
starting point, or focal point, for negotiations to determine the CDI strength parameter,  . 
Ultra-Low-Emission Countries 
Under the CDI, an extremely poor country, with ultra-low emissions, would receive the largest CDI 
payment per capita. This will strike some as peculiar. So, let us review what considerations led to this 
aspect of the design. 
First, under the classic solution to the tragedy of the commons, which gives everyone equal 
atmospheric rights, the lowest-emission countries need the fewest rights. So they sell the most rights 
and obtain the most revenue. The CDI scales this back, but the result is similar. 
The second approach argued directly that low-emission nations should receive CDI payments, and 
high-emission nations should pay. Extending this trend means the lowest-emission nations will receive 
the highest CDI payments. 
The next section argues for the CDI because it directly encourages lower emissions. Such an 
incentive naturally rewards the lowest emitters the most. 
Figure 1. Incentive payments for India under Pricing Incentive 
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5. Non-Price Policies 
Non-price government programs are still needed even with ideal carbon pricing. These include clean-
energy research, siting of transmission lines, mass transit projects, energy efficiency standards, public 
information programs, and many more. To see how these are treated by the Pricing Incentive alone, 
consider an example in which a country has set a uniform carbon tax, with tax rate  , on all carbon 
emissions. When a non-price policy reduces emissions, it will reduce carbon revenue proportionally 
and the national carbon price will, of course, remain constant at  . As a consequence, the Pricing 
Incentive payment,  , will remain zero if  . And it will, unfortunately, 
decrease if  , as the non-price policy reduces emissions,  . So the Pricing Incentive can 
actually discourage non-price programs that reduce emissions. 
Fortunately, as will be seen shortly, the CDI encourages non-price policies by rewarding lower 
emissions per capita. But if there were no CDI, we would need to invent an incentive for non-price 
policies. What would it be? Such an incentive would reward emission reductions directly. We would 
also want it to be simple and revenue neutral. That is best accomplished by the payment formula 
, but what value should be chosen for  ? As just seen, the Pricing Incentive alone 
encourages any country with   to increase emissions. Since   is the average national carbon 
price, roughly half of all nations will fall into this category. However, if the CDI is used and   set 
equal to  , all countries with   will have an incentive to reduce emissions. This is 
demonstrated in Appendix A.5. This should cover all but the countries with the most ambitious 
climate programs, which should be sufficient. Note that we have arrived back at equation (4). 
The CDI solves another, related problem besides the problem with standard non-price policies. It 
motivates countries to put a higher price on coal carbon because this will almost always cause a 
greater reduction of emissions than pricing oil or natural gas. 
Although, in theory, it should not be necessary, the CDI will almost certainly encourage efficiency 
standards that should be implemented simply to save consumers money, but which are often 
overlooked. But it may be wise to explicitly reward standards as well as implementing the CDI. If this 
is desired, fuel-efficiency standards and the like can be re-designed as feebates. The feebates can be 
counted as carbon revenue.
6 However, a number of important efficiency standards, such as building 
codes, cannot be converted to feebates, so CDI is needed for them.
7 
6. Summary of Flexible Global Carbon Pricing Formulas 
Table 2 summarizes the basic version of flexible global pricing, while Appendix B presents a more 
complete version. Implementation requires two fundamental choices: the global target carbon price, 
, and the strength of the Clean Development Incentive,  . The value of the Pricing-Incentive-
strength,  , which results from automatically adjusting   to keep the global average carbon price at 
the target, is suggested as a reasonable value for  . This assures that both   and   will be 
reasonably low, perhaps near 10 percent. 
                                                      
6  A $1-per-gallon-saved feebate applied to all new cars would count the same as a gasoline tax of $1 per gallon applied to 
all the gasoline used by those cars. 
7  Subsidies for renewable technology are generally inefficient. Some, such as subsides for residential photovoltaic solar 
power, are extremely inefficient. For this reason it might be best if they were discouraged by providing them no credit 
toward carbon revenues. But it would be fair to credit them with revenue equal to the amount of carbon they save times 
the global target price of carbon. Flexible Global Carbon Pricing 
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CDI strength,  , and price target,  , are negotiated values, with   suggested as a starting point for 
negotiations. All variables are annual;  and   are measured per capita. This is the basic design. The 
revenue-neutral and stabilized design is given in Appendix B. 
7. A Realistic Example of the Design in Operation 
Having completed the design, it’s informative to see how it might function in the real world. Table 3 
illustrates one plausible possibility, but its values cannot be considered predictive. The table is based 
on the U.S. Department of Energy’s estimates of population and carbon emissions in 2010. 
The basic result shown in Table 3 is that a moderately strong and effective carbon-pricing policy is 
inexpensive—about 1/7 of one percent of GDP for the United States in this example. Understanding 
this requires understanding the true cost of compliance with carbon pricing. This is not related to 
carbon revenues, but rather to costs that society incurs while adapting to lower carbon emissions. 
These costs are proportional to the amount of abatement that takes place and to the costs of abatement. 
The cost per ton of any given abatement can vary from zero to the price of carbon. Few people will 
spend more than $20 to avoid emitting a ton of carbon when a $20 tax can be paid instead. These 
considerations suggest the formula commonly used to approximate societal abatement costs:
8 
  Cost of Abatement = ½ (carbon price) (emissions reduction) =    (6) 
This is the formula used to compute the “Cost of Abatement” in Table 3. 
The policy described by Table 3 is a $20 carbon price target that happens to result in a 20 percent 
reduction in emissions in all nations.
9 This is similar to what is being proposed in the United States in 
                                                      
8  Emissions reductions becomes scarcer as price increases, so more reductions are available near zero. The formula in 
equation (6) is used by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
9  For simplicity a 20% carbon reduction is assumed for all regions even though they implement different carbon prices. 
Also the reduction is not used to alter the emission levels reported by the U.S. DOE for 2010. Steven Stoft 
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early 2009 for the year 2020.
10 However, in this example, the United States participates in a global-
carbon-pricing system. The United States, with more than double the emissions per capita of the next 
highest region, makes the largest CDI payments. Its total cost of abatement, including its share of CDI 
payments, comes to 17 cents per person per day. 
 
That 17 cents is comprised of less than 7 cents for CDI payments and less than 11 cents for 
society’s cost of emission abatement. To check the abatement cost, note that U.S. citizens will reduce 
their carbon emissions by 20 percent or 3.86 tons per person per year. Under the assumed carbon price 
of $20/ton, equation (6) gives a total abatement cost of   per person per year, a bit 
less than 11 cents per day. 
Could there be some significant underestimate of cost? To check equation (6), note that an MIT 
study (Paltsev et al., 2007) of cap-and-trade policies in the United States modeled a carbon tax and 
found values that show equation (6) overestimated costs in every case, especially in the early years. 
Could the Pricing Incentive strength,  , be underestimated? It could be, but since the United States 
sets its carbon price,  , equal to the target price,  , in this example,   has no effect. 
Could the CDI strength,  , be underestimated? If a policy of setting   has been adopted, 
then an underestimate of   would mean an underestimate of  . But as noted,   is only an 
initial bargaining point, and this example assumes that   has been set to 10 percent. Hence   = 10 
percent should simply be viewed as the chosen value of  . 
A separate concern from the total cost to U.S. citizens will be the amount of money spent on CDI 
payments. This comes to about $8 billion per year (not shown) or 1/18 of one percent of GDP. For 
comparison, $20 billion per year would be allowed in this example under the initial Waxman-Markey 
proposal (March 31, 2009) for the purchase of international offsets. That proposal specifies that one 
billion tons of foreign offsets may be purchased, and these could cost nearly $20 per ton. 
                                                      
10  The draft Waxman-Markey bill of March 31, 2009 includes a cap and trade program designed to reduce emissions 20% 
by 2020 and the EPA estimates the price of permits at about $20/ton at that time. 
Table 3. Flexible Global Carbon Pricing, a Plausible Example 
with target   = $20, and Pricing‐Incentive,  , and CDI rate,  , equal to 10%. 
Non‐OECD Countries  OECD Countries   
India  Other  China  E.U.+  U.S.  World 
Units 
Emissions / Person ( )  1.1  2.9  5.1  8.8 19.3 4.5  tons 








Population  1220  3127 1352  893  311  6903  millions 
Carbon Revenue  $22  $40  $102 $263 $387  $94 $/capita‐year 
Pricing Incentive ( )  $0  –$2  $0 $6 $0 $0  $/capita‐year 
Clean Dev. Incentive 
( )  $7 $2  –$1  –$7  –$25  $0 
$/capita‐year 
Transfers    $7 $1  –$1  –$1  –$25  $0  $/capita‐year 
Cost of Adaptation  –$2  –$4  –$10 –$26 –$39  -$9 $/capita‐year 
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In contrast with the United States, very poor countries, such as India, come out a little ahead on the 
transfer payments, $7 per person per year in this case. But if emissions reductions are 20 percent, the 
social abatement cost of the carbon tax will be $2 per person. So the net gain to India’s citizens will be 
a little over one cent per person per day. 
Everything in the example is under policy control except for the amount of emissions reduction. 
But if they were half as much, it would cut in half the cost of abatement, making it cheaper than shown 
to set the target carbon price to $20 per ton. If this is seen to be occurring, the low cost will encourage 
an increase in the target carbon price. If the reduction were double, it would mean that a dramatic, 40 
percent, carbon reduction would be achieved for only twice the cost shown—$130 billion per year, 
instead of $65 billion. That is less than one quarter of one percent of world GDP. 
8. Energy Security Benefits 
Saving on Oil 
Global carbon pricing will reduce carbon emissions globally. In part, that means reducing oil use, 
which will reduce the world price of oil. A $4-per-barrel reduction would save oil-importing nations 
$65 billion per year, an amount equal to the world’s cost of carbon pricing shown in Table 3.  
Countries will likely focus their carbon pricing more on oil than on coal, and those that now 
subsidize gasoline will instead tax it.
11 A calculation in Carbonomics (Stoft, 2008, p. 252) confirms 
that large oil-import cost savings are likely.
12 
The likely focus on oil could save enough money to make significantly higher carbon prices 
acceptable. Lower oil prices in five years are a more immediate and tangible reward than improved 
climate in forty years. This motivation for carbon pricing should not be ignored. 
In contrast to flexible global carbon pricing, a broad cap-and-trade approach keeps the price of oil-
carbon equal to the price of coal-carbon. This is theoretically incorrect, because it ignores the financial 
and security benefits of reducing oil imports. 
India, China and the United States 
China and the United States alone account for roughly 40 percent of all carbon emissions, and with 
India included, these three countries span nearly the full range of emissions. The views of these 
countries regarding global carbon pricing will be key to its chances for acceptance. 
India strongly opposes accepting any cap that might limit its economic growth. Global carbon 
pricing allows India to make a verifiable commitment as a full and equal participant without accepting 
a cap. Moreover, the Clean Development Incentive could assure a net economic gain for India for a 
number of years to come. Like China and the United States, India also has a strong interest in reducing 
oil prices. Flexible global carbon pricing will do more to limit world oil prices than any other strategy 
India could undertake.  
China’s per-capita emissions are four times greater than India’s, and by 2010 its emissions should 
be above the world average. As a consequence, China would actually pay a small amount under global 
pricing’s CDI, unless it sets its carbon price above the target or works hard to reduce its emissions. So 
why should China consider such a plan? First, note that its CDI payment in 2010 would be 25 time 
                                                      
11  Also with a CDI, and especially if feebates are credited as carbon pricing (see footnote in Non-Price Policies), global 
carbon pricing will stimulate fuel-efficiency standards or efficiency incentives for cars and light trucks. 
12  This is based on a conservative estimate of oil-price sensitivity from the International Energy Agency. Steven Stoft 
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less per person than the U.S. payment. Second, in the example of Table 3, its total cost, CDI plus the 
cost of adapting to lower emissions, comes to only $11 per person per year, or about 1/10 of 1% of 
GDP. That cost is the same as if China gave up one week of economic growth—not one-week-per-
year, just a single one-time delay. 
But China will gain an overlooked advantage—savings on imported oil. China is predicted to find 
itself importing 80 percent of its oil by 2030, leaving it highly vulnerable to oil-price spikes. And by 
2030, without a strong international effort, such price spikes will likely be frequent and worse than the 
spike in 2008. Because global carbon pricing causes all participating nations to reduce oil use, China 
would benefit from the efforts of every other nation. But that will happen only if carbon pricing 
succeeds. And that will happen only if China joins the effort. 
The United States emits nearly four times as much carbon per person as does China. Consequently 
its CDI payments are significant, though still tiny as a percent of GDP. But compare global pricing to 
a system in which the developing countries do not make any binding commitments. The United States 
might meet its own cap through the purchase of one billion tons per year of foreign offsets—as under 
the Waxman-Markey (2009) proposal. But this would cost more than the CDI payments in Table 3 and 
would have far less impact on emissions from the developing countries than would their commitment 
to carbon pricing. The United States would also benefit substantially from reduced oil prices, perhaps 
enough to pay the cost of carbon pricing.  
9. Summary and Conclusion 
Stopping climate change requires global cooperation. The Kyoto approach assumes cooperation and 
focuses on controlling the quantity of emissions.
13 That focus undermines fairness, financial 
predictability, and enforceability—qualities needed for effective cooperation and commitment. 
In contrast, global carbon pricing is designed to encourage cooperation and commitment. It 
assumes that, in the long run, caps cannot trick the world into spending more on emission reductions 
than it would spend under a system with clear and predictable cost commitments.  
Global carbon pricing eliminates the probability of unpleasant cost surprises. It allows developing 
countries to commit without committing to the caps they have rejected as inequitable. The requirement 
of a carbon price can be met quickly and surely, and there is no need for corruption-prone carbon 
offsets. 
Flexible global carbon pricing is designed to overcome four design challenges. First, flexible 
pricing fully accommodates cap-and-trade policies. 
Second, carbon pricing is enforced by a Pricing Incentive, but only on average. Nations can 
underachieve and effectively pay others to overachieve. Since the global average is all that matters for 
the climate, this is sufficient. Incentive penalties are backed by trade sanctions. 
Third, the Clean Development Incentive (CDI) encourages low-emission countries to participate 
fully. Under it, high-emission nations contribute funds, and low-emission nations are paid in 
proportion to how well they achieve the global pricing target. The CDI approach is far cheaper than 
paying for clean development one project at a time through the Kyoto Protocol’s corruption-prone 
CDM. 
                                                      
13  For a decade, Kyoto proponents have assumed the developing countries were bluffing with their logical and vehement 
objections to caps. So they have felt no need to address their concerns. This was most recently expressed by Al Gore, “If 
the United States leads, China will follow.” (Guardian, 2009.) Flexible Global Carbon Pricing 
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The forth challenge of carbon pricing is to reward nations that reduce their emissions-per-capita 
using policies other than carbon pricing, such as energy research and energy-efficiency standards. The 
CDI, serving double duty, addresses this problem as well. 
Two aspects of the climate problem are unusual and dangerous. First, action is needed now to 
protect against damage that will occur in the distant future, and that means action must be based on 
uncertainty. Second, the climate externality means every nation has a strong incentive to avoid 
contributing its fair share to the solution. These problems make cooperation difficult. 
The emissions-cap approach denies uncertainty to focus on locking in emission quantities. And it 
reproduces the externality problem with individual national emission targets monetized by permit 
trading. 
In contrast, flexible global carbon pricing focuses on facilitating cooperation and commitment. It 
respects the requests of developing countries not to restrict their growth, and it targets a single carbon 
price for all—inducing some commonality of interest. If the world is to address global warming 
successfully it must learn to cooperate. And cooperation is best learned by building trust, not by 
attempting to lock each nation into an individually-negotiated 15-year commitment of unknown cost. Steven Stoft 
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Appendix A 
Appendix A provides a more detailed discussion of points made in the introduction and in each of the 
four major design sections: flexibility, enforcement, clean development, and non-price policies. The 
numbering and headings in Appendix A match those in the paper’s body. 
A.1. Introduction 
International Cooperation and Commitment 
Cap-and-trade advocates promise “high certainty because emission guarantees are built into the 
policy.” But this fails to account for what might go wrong as the world attempts to negotiate, 
implement, and enforce these built-in guarantees. And, as Nordhaus (2008) says, “Quantity-type 
systems are much more susceptible to corruption than price-type regimes.” Here are some of the 
problems that make quantity targets uncertain. 
Capping Low-Emission Countries. Any cap that causes India, for example, to reduce its 
emissions before 2020 must cap India at a per-capita level 10 times lower than any level Americans 
would accept. The objections of developing countries will likely continue, resulting in an absence of 
any firm commitment. This dramatically increases emission uncertainty. 
Compliance-Cost Uncertainty. Cost uncertainty gives opponents their most effective argument 
against a climate policy and causes its supporters most concern. This blocks commitment, and, 
depending on the cost outcome, will cause some committed nations to renege. 
Negotiations and Delays. Permit trading monetizes the value of a caps, and increases the difficulty 
of negotiating individual caps. If caps are accepted, nations will need to design and test complex cap-
and-trade systems. 
The Clean Development Mechanism. As discussed below, this backward market for not 
supplying “bads” will face growing opportunities for gaming. This makes the effect of caps on 
developed countries uncertain, and emission reductions more uncertain. 
Achieving Targets and Enforcement. The Kyoto Protocol set targets 15 years in advance. But 
China’s emissions grew 27% in ten years from 1990, and will grow an estimated 127% in the ten years 
from 2000. No one guessed this in 2000. Because long-range targets are known to be inaccurate, they 
provide a ready excuse for underachievers when they miss their targets. This makes enforcement of 
quantity targets nearly impossible. 
Cap and Trade. As caps bind tighter, say in the 2020s, permit prices will become substantial. 
Already these prices are understood to be taxes passed on to consumers. Someday, their normal 
volatility will result in an unfortunately large and rapid price increase. Then a voter backlash against 
tax rates set by speculators will become almost inevitable. 
International Unraveling. When national caps fail because of enforcement problems or a cap-and-
trade backlash, it undermines the stability of the international agreement. 
Incentive Problems with the U.N.’s Clean Development Mechanism 
Incentive problems with the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism stem from two sources. 
First, although CDM poses as a market mechanism, it lacks the crucial character of a market—
consumers who care about the quality of what they purchase. In the CDM market consumers only care 
about price, so the quality of CER offsets would fall to zero if the U.N. were not enforcing quality. Flexible Global Carbon Pricing 
17 
Unfortunately, quality must be defined by the “additionality” of the emissions, but the baseline for 
this determination becomes increasingly murky over the years. Already the vast majority of project 
applications must be rejected as fraudulent and the U.N. has had to suspend Det Norske Veritas, its 
original and most trusted verifier of CDM projects. Along with flaws in its auditing process, DNV had 
signed off on five projects it had not reviewed. (AccountancyAge, Dec. 1, 2008.) 
The root problem is that the incentives in a market for not supplying “bads,” as opposed to a 
market for “goods,” are hopelessly misaligned at all levels. This is why the only private markets that 
pay people not to do bad things are known as “protection rackets” and blackmail. A market for “bads” 
is not a new idea in need of improvement, it is simply a bad, and very old, idea. There will be times 
when it is necessary, but for the most part, the CDM market is entirely unnecessary. A carbon price 
would work far better. 
Can a global carbon price internalize the climate externality? 
National caps reproduce the externality problem that caps are intended to solve. A nation that manages 
to raise its cap, as Russia did, gains the full benefit of increased emissions but incurs only the same 
small fraction of the climate costs normally incurred when increasing national emissions. When 
nations are forced to vote on a single global carbon price, this does not exactly force each nation to 
internalize the external cost of its emissions. Rather, when a given nation votes for higher emissions, it 
finds it must accept the effects on itself of more emissions from all other countries. The effect is 
similar to internalization of the external effects and it dramatically improves cooperation.
  
Internalizing externalities would cause a nation that is immune to climate change to vote for lower 
emissions. Implementing a single global cap or carbon price, unfortunately, does not accomplish this. 
No policy set by a vote of nations seems capable of true internalization, but voting on a single global 
cap or a single global price comes close.   
A.2 Flexibility and the Definition of “National Carbon Price” 
How problematic is uneven carbon pricing within a nation? 
In theory, under flexible pricing, a nation could choose only the least effective fossil-fuel tax. In fact, 
economic theory predicts a tilt in this direction, because the cost of adapting to a tax is proportional to 
its effect.
14 However, the CDI rewards every decrease in emissions per capita, which provides one 
reason to raise the price on any fuel, say coal, that responds more to price. This tilts carbon pricing 
back in the right direction. However, if a nation is strictly minimizing the total economic cost of 
compliance, the CDI will not have a strong-enough effect to equalize prices across fuels. While the 
political process of price-setting is unlikely to pay much attention to such economic calculations, it’s 
worth checking them a bit more closely. 
Suppose one fuel, oil, is five times less responsive to carbon pricing than another fuel, coal. 
Because the social abatement cost due to carbon pricing is given by   (equation (6)), oil will have 
a five times lower abatement cost if exposed to the same carbon price as coal. A government could 
take this into account and minimize social cost by imposing a five times higher carbon price on oil. 
This is called Ramsey-Boiteux pricing, and it is an efficient way to tax, though unpopular for other 
reasons. 
                                                      
14  If a tax did not reduce emission, it would impose no adjustment costs; it would simply transfer revenues from one group 
to another. So a tax that did not reduce emissions would be the cheapest form of compliance. Steven Stoft 
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But for a Pigouvian tax (used to reduce pollution, not to raise revenue) this type of pricing is not 
efficient. Instead, a uniform carbon price is efficient. In the present example, Ramsey-Boiteux pricing 
would result in a 45% loss of emission reduction compared with efficient uniform pricing. But this 
does not take account of the fact that oil has energy-security externalities and should be taxed more for 
that reason. It also does not take the CDI into account. Moreover, governments have almost never 
engaged in Ramsey-Boiteux pricing, even when it was recommended. In any case, if pricing 
unevenness proved to be a serious problem, the system could be amended to limit the extent of 
unevenness. 
It should be remembered that even Europe, which has adopted permit trading to equalize prices, 
has missed the mark of uniform prices by a wide margin. Carbon taxes on gasoline are vastly higher 
than those on coal. In fact, nations have legitimate reasons for some internal unevenness in carbon 
pricing, such as health and energy security. So insisting on completely equal carbon prices may not 
improve efficiency. 
Can flexible carbon pricing accommodate international cap-and-trade offsets?  
Currently, the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme relies partly on purchases of carbon offsets (“Certified 
Emission Reductions,” or CERs) under the U.N.’s Clean Development Mechanism. This system could 
continue and be integrated into flexible global carbon pricing. For example consider a purchase of 
Chinese CERs by the France. The payments from French companies would be counted as carbon 
revenue collected by France and the emission reduction would, of course, reduce China’s emissions 
per capita. As an alternative approach, it might work to credit both the EU and China with a transfer 
payment that would be counted against their incentive payments. 
A.3 Enforcement 
Enforcing Incentive Payments with Trade Sanctions? 
An international climate agreement is a lot like a cartel—the member nations agree to follow the rules 
for mutual benefit. But following the rules is against their self interest, even though having the 
organization succeed is very much in their interest. As a result, cartel members usually cheat and 
cartels usually fall apart. Almost certainly, a successful climate agreement will require some method 
of enforcing its rules. 
As Joseph E. Stiglitz (2006) explains in his recent book, Making Globalization Work, “There is 
already a framework for doing this: international trade sanctions. The Montreal Protocol on ozone-
depleting gases employed the threat of trade sanctions-though they never had to be used.” But as he 
also notes, this approach has been tested in a judicial proceeding of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). 
The United States passed a law forbidding importation of shrimp caught in nets without U.S.-style 
turtle excluder devices. The World Trade Organization (WTO) at first ruled against the United States 
because it had not applied its regulation fairly, but in this ruling it stated unequivocally, “We have not 
decided that sovereign states should not act together bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally, either 
within the WTO or in other international fora, to protect endangered species or to otherwise protect the 
environment. Clearly, they should and do.” Eventually, the U.S. corrected the unfairness and the WTO 
ruled in its favor. 
Clearly, if the United States can enforce its view of global turtle endangerment with trade 
sanctions, the U.N. could enforce a climate agreement with trade sanctions. Since the poorest countries 
profit from compliance and most wealthy countries will likely cooperate voluntarily, such enforcement Flexible Global Carbon Pricing 
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should rarely be needed. Moreover the possibility of trade sanctions will induce most countries to play 
it safe and comply, even if not so inclined. 
Won’t payments be delayed too long by the need to estimate emissions? 
Most nations will know what price of carbon they set and how much revenue they collected. This will 
provide a good estimate of emissions. Other indicators, such as past trends and GDP, can be used as 
well. Incentive payments are not based on year-to-year changes, but on aggregate values that change 
slowly from year to year, so accuracy is not difficult. 
The simplest quick estimation procedure is to ask each country to estimate their own emissions, 
and then charge them a slightly high rate of interest on funds they over-collect and must return when 
the final accounting is made. A risk-free interest rate would be paid on over-payments. 
Can the Pricing-Incentive-Rate   be Estimated?  
This section in the body of the paper mentioned Result 1, which concerns how a nation would respond 
to the Pricing Incentive if it used cost-benefit analysis. Assuming that nations minimize the social cost 
of adapting to carbon pricing, we have Result  1, which is not intuitive, but is demonstrated in 
Appendix D. 
Result 1: If   is a nation’s short- and long-run price elasticity of the demand for carbon, then, when 
 is set so that a nation chooses to set   equal to  ,  . 
This gives us several reasons to believe that   will be small. First, the long-run price elasticity of 
energy is generally thought to be fairly low. Nordhaus (2007b) reports a 10-year elasticity for oil of 
only 0.24. Second, the price of carbon is only part of the cost of energy, and at first it will be a small 
part.
15 Third, the short-run price elasticity is much smaller than the long-run elasticity and should have 
a strong influence since politics generally takes a short-run view. 
How Much Will Carbon Prices Vary from Country to Country? 
Equalizing carbon prices across nations tends to reduce the overall cost of climate stabilization.
16 
Global carbon pricing contains incentives that encourage some uniformity of national prices. The first 
of these is the result of the social costs of compliance—the cost of reducing emissions to adapt to a 
higher price of carbon. As the carbon price increases, abatement costs increase slowly at first and then 
more rapidly. So at first, the Pricing Incentive more than compensates for abatement costs, but 
eventually the costs rise faster than incentive payments. To the extent abatement-cost curves have a 
similar shape in different countries, the countries should set similar carbon prices. To understand this 
better, consider equation (6), reproduced here for convenience.  
  Abatement cost = ½ (carbon price) (emissions reduction) =    (6) 
                                                      
15  This means the elasticity of fuel with respect to the price of carbon is less than it is with respect to the fuel’s price. For 
low carbon prices, it will be much lower. 
16  Suppose the only benefit of carbon pricing is a more stable climate. Then, if one country had a lower price for carbon, it 
would be failing to take advantage of carbon saving opportunities that were cheaper than opportunities in countries with 
higher prices. This is not efficient. In reality there are many other reasons, such as local environmental concerns and 
energy security, for pricing carbon. So unequal prices can be efficient.  Steven Stoft 
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Since there is already a considerable cost to emissions when   is zero,   for small 
values of  . The means that   is approximately  . So cost starts out slowly as just noted. 
The second effect comes from the Clean Development Incentive (CDI) and is illustrated in Figure 1 
above. There will also likely be domestic and international pressures for countries to meet the global 
target price. These pressures, and CDI for low-emission countries, will be stronger below the target 
price than above it. If the divergence of carbon prices between nations is felt to be too great, the 
Pricing-Incentive function can be redesigned slightly to be stronger below   than above  . 
A.4 The Clean Development Incentive (CDI) 
This section examines the value-based approach and the cost-based approach to designing the CDI. 
The value-based approach is the market-based, equal-rights approach. The next section examines an 
approach based on the need for a direct incentive to reduce emissions.  
The Market-Based, Value-Based Approach to the CDI Design 
Surprisingly, a slight modification of the most basic cap-and-trade approach gives us the basic form of 
the CDI. Imagine placing a cap on global emissions and auctioning off the permits. This will raise 
hundreds of billions of dollars per year, which must be returned to the nations of the world. Return it 
in proportion to emissions, and the cap has no effect. But return it in proportion to population, and the 
cap functions as intended. 
Returning auction revenues in this way is equivalent to distributing free emission permits to nations 
in proportion to their populations. And this is equivalent, at the national level, to the classic solution to 
the tragedy of the commons, which is to distribute tradable rights to the commons on an equal-per-
person basis. But how can this cap-and-trade approach be used as a CDI that accompanies a pricing 
approach? 
The result of returning auction revenues on a per-person basis is that any specific country will 
receive   in revenue, where   is the country’s population,   is the global 
population,   is total global emissions, and   is the price that results from auctioning the permits. 
However each country will spend   buying permits, where   is the country’s emissions. The 
result is a net payment to the country of 
Net auction payment =  . 
Dividing by the country’s population gives 
Net per-capita auction payment =  , 
Where   and   are global and national emissions per capita, respectively. 
This shows the payments that would result from an equal-per-capita cap-and-trade program. But 
consider such a payment policy on its own, without permits or an auction. First, since the auction 
process is revenue neutral, such payments would also be revenue neutral and pay for themselves. 
Second, high emission countries, with  , would make large payments. The United States, which 
emits about 5.5 billion tons of greenhouse gases more than average could easily pay over $100 billion 
per year to low-emission countries. Third, sensible countries would realize that reducing emissions 
saves them money. As a consequence, countries would implement some system, either a cap or a tax, 
that resulted in a national price for carbon of  . 
This means that adopting a CPI payment of   is like adopting a duplicate incentive 
system equivalent to global carbon pricing with a target price of  . This is clearly too strong a 
measure to add to basic global carbon pricing, but it does have excellent incentive properties and it 
does transfer funds to low-emission countries. It also solves the problem of non-price policies Flexible Global Carbon Pricing 
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discussed in the next section. So it makes sense to use a scaled-down version of the formula as the 
basic CPI formula: 
Per-capita CPI payment   
The factor   would need to be set to some value such as 10 percent to scale back the strength of the 
incentive and the magnitude of the transfer payments.  
Selecting Clean Development Incentive Parameter,   
The classic approach of giving each person the same tradable rights to the atmosphere provides little 
guidance as to the proper value for Q, the strength of the incentive. So a cost-based approach is 
considered next. 
The first approach is based on rewarding value, while this cost-based approach is based on 
compensating the cost of participation in global carbon pricing. To understand the difference, consider 
the case of two countries, with the same population, and with initial emission levels of 1.1 tons and 9.9 
tons per capita respectively. Both set a global carbon price of $10 per ton, which results in emission 
levels of 1 ton and 9 tons. By equation (6), the cost of compliance ( ) is roughly $0.50 and $4.50 
per capita, respectively. However if the same reductions were achieved by issuing equal rights of five 
tons per capita under a cap-and-trade system, the low emitters would each sell four tons of rights to the 
high emitters, and those rights would have a value of $40. So this market-based approach results in a 
payment to low emitters of $40 per person when the cost of complying with that market-based policy 
is only $0.50 per person. 
The source of this discrepancy is the fact that adapting to the global-carbon-pricing policy did not 
bring about the low emission level, so there was no cost to producing the value of that low emission 
level. This example does not show that all people do not have an equal right to the atmosphere; it 
simply explains the difference between value and cost. 
To base the CDI on cost, we need a benchmark for cost. Fortunately, the Pricing Incentive and the 
value of   provide some cost information. If a country sets its carbon price to zero, it loses any 
positive Price-Incentive payment and is charged a penalty. The extent of this net loss puts an upper 
limit on the country’s cost of compliance. 
The cost we are looking for should apply specifically to low-emission countries, and it should be 
valid with the CDI in operation. This may seem circular since we are going to design the CDI on the 
basis of this cost, but there is a simple and useful result that anticipates the CDI, equations (4) and (5), 
and is demonstrated in Appendix C. 
Result 2:  Under the proposed Pricing Incentive and CDI for countries with  , average 
compliance cost per capita is less than  , provided these countries’ weighted-
average carbon price is  . 
Notice that Result 2 does not give an estimate, but only an upper limit on average compliance costs of 
below-average-emission countries.
17 Compliance cost for very low-emission countries will, of course, 
be much less than average and approaches zero as emissions-per-person approaches zero. 
                                                      
17 Because   is not guaranteed to equal  ,   is not guaranteed to be an upper limit on costs. However, 
Because of equation (5), low-emission countries will have a stronger incentive than high-emission countries to achieve 
. Also, the reasons for   to overstate compliance costs are quite strong, unless the distribution of emissions-per-
capita is narrowly distributed around  , and this will not likely be the case for many years to come. Hence   can 
safely be taken as an upper bound. Steven Stoft 
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A.5 Non-Price Policies 
Why the CDI Is Needed to Encourage Non-Price Policies 
The fourth and final design problem is to include an incentive for emissions policies other than carbon 
pricing. To see that the Pricing Incentive does not provide adequate motivation for such policies and 
why this is a problem, consider the following example. A country taxes all carbon with a tax rate of 
, exactly as required. Suppose this country can reduce the use of gasoline by improving the design 
of highway intersections. Also suppose that, without the carbon tax, all investments of this type that 
save more than they cost have been made. 
Because the carbon price reflects a true external cost, this cost should be taken into account by 
government decisions. Taking this carbon cost into account will make more highway efficiency 
improvements cost effective. From a global perspective, these should be undertaken. But does the 
carbon Pricing Incentive motivate a national government to take such action? 
If the government did improve efficiency, it would reduce emissions and carbon revenue 
proportionally. So, of course, the price of carbon would remain unchanged, and there would be no 
direct reward from a Pricing Incentive payment. But the country would pay fewer carbon taxes. Would 
this motivate the government to make the efficiency improvement? It would not, because the carbon 
taxes are not a national cost. When a consumer pays $1 of carbon taxes this simply transfers money 
from the consumer to the government. The government can use the revenue to reduce some other tax 
or to provide some service. Since paying the tax is not a cost to the nation, stopping that payment is 
not a net gain. Hence the Pricing Incentive provides the government with no reason to implement such 
non-price carbon-reducing policies, even though they are cost effective from a global perspective. 
This example shows a gap in the Pricing Incentive, which needs to be filled by an incentive that 
directly rewards lower emissions. The CDI does that. While there may be examples of non-price 
programs that are properly motivated by the Pricing Incentive, these appear to be difficult to discover. 
There are however many examples of non-price policies which would benefit from the CDI. These 
include appropriate government-funded energy-research programs and appropriate efficiency 
standards. 
It should be remembered that such non-price programs are properly motivated by normal cost 
saving up to a level determined by the pre-carbon-tax cost of fossil fuels. It is only the cost of the 
carbon tax that will not be properly taken into account if governments are rational. However, there 
may be a good argument that a CDI incentive will remind governments to implement ordinary energy 
efficiency programs, which are often overlooked. 
Analysis of   
Checking the Pricing Incentive,  , shows that when  , the Pricing Incentive 
rewards increases in emissions,  , which is the opposite of what we want. Appendix C (Result 3) 
shows that, for countries with  , picking   gives them a positive incentive to reduce 
emissions. This is not ideal, but it seems adequate. In fact only   gives the optimal incentive for 
correcting consumer myopia with regard to carbon pricing. Flexible Global Carbon Pricing 
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Mapping the Pricing Incentive and the CDI 
 
 
Figures 2 shows the incentive to reduce emissions (or raise them) without CDI, and Figure 3 shows the 
total incentive with CDI added. The CDI is assumed to use incentive-strength factor  . As can 
be seen, without CDI, any country that sets   will experience an incentive to increase emissions 
per capita. But after the CDI is added any country with   will have an incentive to reduce 
emissions per capita. Of course if   were larger, the incentive to reduce emissions would be more far 








































A contour map of   constructed from equations (2), (4) and (5). Steven Stoft 
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Although Figure 3 appears radically changed by the addition of the CDI, note that the incentive to 
raise the price of carbon remains unchanged except in the lower-left quadrant, where it is increased by 
equation (5). The vertical spacing of the contours, which is perfectly even along any vertical line, 
remains the same as in Figure 2, except for the lower-left quadrant. Next note that moving to the left, 
toward lower emissions, reduces the total incentive payment,  , in all cases where   is less than 
$40, which is twice  . Flexible Global Carbon Pricing 
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Appendix B 
A Revenue-Neutral and Stabilized Design 
The basic design, shown in Table 2, has three main shortcomings. Neither the pricing nor the 
development incentive is revenue neutral, and the adjustment formula for   needs to be limited to 
prevent unexpected dynamics. The necessary modifications of the basic design are presented below. 
Revenue-Neutral Pricing Incentive 
The classic approach to revenue neutrality for the Pricing Incentive would be to base the rewards on 
the actual average global price,  , instead of the target price  , but this creates the following 
fairness issue. If   then the classic solution will penalize some nations that fall short of   but 
exceed  . This will reasonably be viewed as unfair—if a country meets the target,  , it should not 
be penalized.  
The approach recommended here works as follows: 
1.  Penalize countries with   exactly as specified in Table 2. 
2.  If penalties plus banked funds are sufficient, reward countries with   exactly as specified 
in Table 2. 
3.  If funds remain after steps 1 and 2, bank them for future rewards. 
4.  If penalties plus banked funds are not sufficient in step 2, calculate rewards as specified in 
Table 2 and then reduce them all proportionally just to the point where all funds from current 
penalties and all banked funds are used. 
Revenue-Neutral Clean Development Incentive 
The basic Clean Development Incentive,  , is automatically revenue neutral. But when 
payments are discounted to low-emission countries with  , CDI collections from countries with 
 need to be scaled down to compensate. Again, the payment for countries with   are 
calculated per Table 2, and then all are reduced proportionally.  
Stabilized Automatic Pricing-Incentive Adjustment Rule 
The following are suggested additions to the adjustment rule designed to avoid large swings in  . It 
should be remembered countries that set   will not be affected be   in any case. 
Initial incentive strength:     
Incentive adjustment rule:   
Incentive change limits:   
Incentive limits:     Steven Stoft 
26 
Appendix C 
Explanations of Results 
Result 1 assumes the nation in question is maximizing net benefit. 
Result 1: If   is a nation’s short- and long-run price elasticity of the demand for carbon, then, 
when   is set so that a nation chooses to set   equal to  ,  . 
Although price elasticities are often stated as positive, as in Result 1, this proof uses the technical 
definition, which makes   negative, in which case Result 1 concludes   
We begin with the basic Price-Incentive formula: 
   
The marginal incentive to raise   is:   
Now define   to be the inverse of the emissions function,  . 
Social adjustment cost,  , is given by:   
Differentiating:   
Now equate the marginal incentive to raise   with the marginal cost of raising  . 
    
Setting   gives    , 
where   is the elasticity of emissions with respect to the price of carbon. 
This result assumes short- and long-run elasticities are equal. In reality, short- and long-run 
elasticities are different and there is likely an appropriate intermediate value for   that can be 
calculated as an appropriately weighted average of the spectrum of elasticities. The formula for the 
appropriate weighted average is conjectured to be the annual elasticities (1-year, 2-year, 3-year…) 
averaged using weights that decline at the nation’s political discount rate (e.g., 1, 0.9, 0.81…). 
Result 2:  Under the proposed Pricing Incentive and CDI for countries with  , average 
compliance cost per capita is less than  , provided these countries’ weighted-
average carbon price is  . 
Explanation of Result 2: 
1.  According to equation (2), (4) and (5), the total transfer,  , to countries with   will 
satisfy: 
 
  Because the actual CDI is only   when   
2.  However, if these countries set p=0, their transfers would fall to: 
 
3.  Hence their net reward for their actual level of participation is the difference, or: Flexible Global Carbon Pricing 
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Net reward for compliance   
4.  If the cost of compliance were greater than their net reward, they would not comply. 
5.  If the weighted average carbon price of these countries is  , then the weighted average cost of 
compliance is at most  . 
Result 3: Adding   to the Pricing Incentive provides a positive incentive to reduce 
emissions whenever  . 
Explanation of Result 3: 
1.  The Pricing Incentive is  , so adding the new term gives: 
2.    
3.  Which equals  . 
4.  Differentiating with respect to   gives   
5.  This is negative, indicating an incentive to reduce  , if and only if  . Steven Stoft 
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